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Traditionally, the mental capacity for experiencing, constructing, or manipulating 'rnental
imagery’ (quasi-perceptual experience). Imagination is also regarded as responsible for
fantasy, inventiveness, idiosyncrasy, and creative, original, and insightful thoughtin general,
and, sometimes, fora much wider range ofmental activities dealing with the non-actual, such
as supposing, pretending, ‘seeing as’, thinking ofpossib ilities, and even being mistaken. See
representation.
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Introduction
Despite being a familiar word of everydaylanguage, imagination is a very complex, contested,
and evaluativelyloaded concept. lt, like many cognate terms, often appears to have radically
differentsenses and connotations when used in different contexts. Furthermore, although it
plays onlya small overt role in mostcontemporarytheories ofthe mind, it has played a much
more prominent part in the past. The conceptwill thus best be understood through its history.
Ancient and Medieval Conception
The concept ofthe imagination seems to have been first introduced into philosophy by
Aristotle, who tells us that "imagination [phantasia] is (apart from any metaphorical sense of
the word) the process bywhich we saythat an image [phantasma] is presented to us" (De
Anima, 428a 1-4). It has been questioned in recenttimes whetherthe Greek words phantasia
and phantasma are really equivalentto "imagination" and "(menta|) image" as heard in
contemporary usage. However, there can be little doubt that, at least until very recenttimes,
theoretical discussions ofphantasia, its Latin translation imaginatio, and their etymological
descendants, continued to be rooted in the concepts introduced byAristotle and the problems
arising from his rather elliptical explanation ofthem. Very arguablythis is true of all Western
philosophical schools: Stoics, Epicureans and Neoplatonists quite as much as avowed
Aristoteleans; Muslims as much as Christians; and, come to that, Empiricists quite as much
as Rationalists.
According to Aristotle "The soul never thinks without a mental image [phantasma]" (De Anima,
431a 15-20). ltwould appearthat, for him (and, again, for mostofsuccessors, until very
recently), such images played something like the role that is played in contemporary cognitive
theory by "mental representations". In this tradition, imagery, and thus imagination, has an
essential role to playin all forms ofthinking (with the possible exception ofdirect intuitions of
Platonic forms, or ofthe divine). It has no special connection with inventiveness or creativity.
tdoes, however, have a special connection with desire. Aristotle argues that our desire for
(and, thus, pursuitof) anything notactually presentto the senses must be mediated by an
'mage ofthe desired object. Aristotle's treatment is morally neutral, but his notion ofdesirous
'magination maylater have become conflated with the Hebraic concept of yetser, the willful
(but also semi-divine) faculty in humanitythat led to Adam's (and, indeed, all subsequent) sin.
Atany rate, in the Judaeo-Christian intellectual tradition (from ancientto relatively recenttimes)
'magination, although recognized as indispensable to cognition, was usually profoundly
distrusted. Unless strictly disciplined by reason itwould soon lead us into concupiscence and
sin.
But, of course, the connection between imagination and perception is the more fundamental.
Aristotle's conception ofphantasia/imagination seems to be closely bound up with his
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postulation ofwhat came to be called the "common sense" or sensus communis. This is the
part of the psyche responsible forthe binding of the deliverances ofthe individual sense
organs into a coherent and intelligible representation, and for apprehending the so called
"common sensibles", those aspects ofthe world (broadly, the spatio-temporal aspects) that
can be known through more than one sense mode without being the characteristic proper
object ofany ofthem (Aristotelian common sensibles are broadly coextensive with Lockean
"primary qualities"). In fact, it is plausible to interpret phantasia and sensus communis as
different aspects or modes ofa single faculty, depending on whether it is regarded as
receptive or productive, or on whether it is operating in the presence orthe absence of
whatever is being mentally represented. Phantasmata are generated in either case, butwhen
their immediate cause is an objectdirectly before us the tendencyis to referto them as
percepts, and to the process as perception; when memoryof previouslyobserved things is the
source, reference will more likely be to imageryand imagination. Thus imagination came to be
particularly associated with thinking about things that are not actually currently present to the
senses: things thatare not reallythere.
Some ofAristotle's successors tended to laythe stress on the conceptual separation ofthe
notions ofimagination and sensus communis. Thus Early Christian and Medieval anatomists
often located sensus communis at the frontofthe brain's firstventricle, readyto receive sense
impressions, whereas imagination was placed at the rear ofthis ventricle (or even in the
second ventricle), and was responsible for holding and perhaps consolidating the resultant
images, and passing them back to the other ventricles and faculties (where they could be
used in thoughtor stored in memory). Imagination mightalso, sometimes, be held
responsible forthe recombining ofvarious image parts into chimerical forms.
This lattertype ofprocess would allow the individual mind a degree offreedom and a scope
for idiosyncracythatwould hardly have been available from the othertraditional faculties,
constrained as theywere by reality and the laws oflogic. It would also, of course, give rise to
images even more removed from presentactualitythan images retrieved intact from memory,
and thus even more quintessentiallyimaginary In this vein, we sometimes find modern
writers making a distinction between "memoryimagery" and "imagination imagery", or even
restricting the use of "imagination" (and, a fortiori, "imaginary") to thoughts aboutthings that
have never (or never yet) been actually experienced. (For some reason, words derived from the
original Greek term, such as "fantasy", "fancy", or "phantasm", seem to have come to connote
unrealityeven more stronglythan "imagination" and its cognates. It is worth noting thatsome
medieval authors, finding both the Greek and the Latin terms available, did attempt to draw
functional and anatomical distinctions between imaginatio and phantasia, but no clear
consensus on how this distinction was to be drawn is apparent, and these attempts seem
unlikelyto have significantlyinfluenced more recent usages.)
Modern Usage
Other ancient and medieval authors, however, were more inclined to stress the underlying
identity ofthe imagination and the common sense, and this interpretation probably became
more widespread with the increased availability of more accurate Aristotelian texts and
translations in the later middle ages and renaissance. We find this tendency even in such a
consciously anti-Aristotelian figure as Descartes, who, in the Treatise on Man, explicitly
identifies both the sensus communis and the imagination with the surface ofthe pineal gland,
upon which images (ldeés) both ofsense and ofmemory orfancy are inscribed. Although it is
important not to confuse these "corporeal ideas" with the "clear and distinct ideas" that play so
prominent a part in Descartes‘ epistemology, it is surely not coincidental that the site of the
Cartesian imagination/sensus communis, the pineal surface, is also the privileged site of
mind-bodyinteraction, the lynchpin that holds togetherthe two metaphysical worlds of
Cartesianism. As it had done for Aristotle, the imagination/sensus communis mediated
between the bodily senses, and the (now incorporeal) rational mind.
Afterthe conceptual revolutions of the 17th centurythe Aristotelian concept of sensus
communis largely disappeared from philosophical discussion, and, inasmuch as the
functions that had been ascribed to itwere considered ofinterest, theywere likelyto be directly
ascribed to imagination. In the Em piricisttradition, images, underthe rubric of "ideas", came
more than everto be seen as the preeminent, even the only, form ofmental content. Hume,
indeed, frequently uses "imagination" as a virtual synonym for "mind". This is reasonable
enough inasmuch as he regards the mind as no more than a bundle ofimages (impressions
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and ideas), and cognition as a matter oftheir vicissitudes and associative interactions. But
even for Hume, imagination has a special perceptual role to play. It bears the responsibility
(through the wayin which itautomatically associates similar and contiguous impressions) for
our natural tendencyto believe in the existence of real and persistent objects existing outside
the mind. Likewise (because it also tends to associate similar impressions or impression
complexes with certain words) it is responsible forthe waythatwe categorize things into kinds
(seeing both Rover and Fido as dogs, for example).
In a sense, for Hume, these latterfunctions ofimagination are defects ofthe human mind.
Philosophical analysis (he argues) shows thatour natural belief (engendered byimagination)
that the world contains various objects ofvarious kinds cannot be rationallygrounded. Kant
assigns similarfunctions to imagination [einbildungskraft], butwithoutsuch a skeptical twist.
Imagination makes knowledge ofthe phenomenal world possible, bysynthesizing the
incoherentsensory manifold into representational images suitable to be brought under
concepts. The Kantian imagination, in this regard, seems, broadlyspeaking, to fill much the
same role as the Aristotelian sensus communis. However, it has by now become clearjust
how poorlywe understand how anysuch faculty could possiblywork. Kant rejects Hume's
purely associative account, and argues that the imaginative synthesis must be governed bya
priori rules or schemata, but how theyoperate is "an art concealed in the depths ofthe human
soul, whose real modes ofactivity nature is hardlylikely everto allow us to discover" (Critique
ofPure Reason A141-B181). The question as to how meaningful mental representations can
arise in us remains obscure (or, at the least, very controversial) to this day.
With the rise ofthe Romantic movement in the latter part of the 18th century, the main focus of
discussion concerning imagination shifted awayfrom cognitive theory and epistemology, and
towards its role in original, creative thinking, especiallyin the arts. This role had been
acknowledged at least as far back as the work of Flavius Philostratus (c. 3rd centuryAD.).
Also, unsurprisingly, imagination had a long standing place in discussions ofthe nature of
dreams and visions. What happened with Romanticism was notso much a
reconceptualization ofimagination, but rather a revaluation of certain concepts that had long
been associated with it. Originality, passion, the unreal, and non-rational thought, all generally
deprecated in former ages, suddenly achieved a new, strongly positive evaluation. Thus the
stock of imagination, as the facultysupposedly responsible for such things, also rose sharply.
In this cultural context, the fact that its workings were mysterious became an asset rather than
a liability. Hyperbolic praise of the imagination became commonplace in Romantic writings,
and certain Romantic aphorisms on the subject became (and remain) intellectual
commonplaces. Although some Romantic authors, most notably Samuel Taylor Coleridge, did
attempt to develop a new philosophy of imagination adequate to its new high status, in fact
they relied heavilyon Kantand post-Kantian German idealism (and Plotinus, who himself
relied heavilyon Aristotle), and the results, although suggestive and much quoted, are (from a
philosophical perspective) fragmentary and largelyincoherent. Nevertheless, for many
intellectuals "imagination" remains a term ofgreat cultural significance, butone whose
primary association is with aesthetic theory ratherthan epistemology, and which is most
naturallyfirst approached through the study ofthe ideas ofliteraryfigures such as Coleridge.
Qontemporao/Usfilfi
Although one major 20th century philosopher (Sartre) wrote two books on the imagination early
in his career, bythe mid twentieth centurythe topic had become quite unfashionable in
philosophical circles. Mostanalytical philosophers, where theyshowed interestatall, seem to
have come to doubtwhetherthe imagination even exists. Gilbert Ryle declared, in The
Conceptofll/lind, that "There is no special Faculty of Imagination, occupying itselfsing|e-
mindedlyin fancied viewings and hearings" (1949), and this soon became a widely accepted
viewpoint. It was pointed outthat although the verb "to imagine" in some contexts seems to be
used to referto the having ofimagery, in other contexts this is notobviouslythe case. For
example, it is not immediately apparentthat imagining that Goldbach's conjecture has been
proven involves (or even can involve) imageryin any central way. Such imagining seems to be
more closely akin to supposing, orjust believing falsely, than to visualizing. In other contexts,
"imagining" seems to be used in a waythat is closerto "pretending" orto "thinking ofa
possibility". How, ltwas asked, could all ofthese diverse sorts ofmental act be reasonably
supposed to be the results ofthe operation ofa single, unitary mental faculty.
It might equally be asked how some trite facts about linguistic usage could be thoughtto raise
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a serious challenge to a key component ofthe cognitive theorythat had dominated Western
thought almostsince its inception. (There are hotdogs, sun dogs, dog ends, and dog day
afternoons, and a dogged investigation mayinvolve dogging someone's footsteps. None of
them involve canine quadrupeds, but, equally, none of these expressions raise the slightest
doubts aboutthe existence ofsuch creatures.) One factor, no doubt, was a reaction againstthe
excesses of Romantic rhetoric, but, more importantly the traditional imagery centered theories
of cognition had come into question for quite different reasons. The combination of the
linguisticturn in philosophyand the Behavioristturn in psychology(itself partlyinspired bythe
"imageless thought" psychology ofthe Wiirzburg school) led to a widespread acceptance of
the view that thought is ultimately based upon language ratherthan on imagery, and powerful
criticisms oflong accepted imagery based theories oflinguistic meaning were putforvvard in
the writings ofphilosophers such as Frege, Wittgenstein, and Moritz Schlick. John B. Watson
(1913), the influential instigator ofthe Behaviorist movement in psychologywentso far as to
question the very existence ofimagery, and although few philosophers went quite this far, the
debunking tone taken toward the notion bythinkers as diverse as Ryle and the French author
Alain, led to a philosophical climate in which ltwas generally not taken seriously. Certainlyit
was no longer ubiquitous in cognitive theory, as itformerlyhad been, and we should hardly be
surprised that in such circumstances it became difficultto see any unifying thread in all the
diverse usages of "imagine" that had emerged overthe centuries, still less anytheoretical
need for a faculty of imagination to accountfor them.
Things changed somewhat in the 1960s early1970s, when (through the efforts of cognitive
psychologists such as Allan Paivio, Roger Shepard, and Stephen Kosslyn) imagery once
again became respectable as a topic for experimental psychological investigation. Ataboutthe
same time, considerations ofthe need for an explanatoryframework capable of handling
cognitive process in higher animals and human infants (first language learning, in particular)
led theorists awayfrom theories that implied that "natural" (actuallyspoken) language is
representationally basic. However, imageryis still farfrom regaining acceptance as the
fundamental form ofmental representation, and currenttheories ofimage formation hardly
aspire to the central place in cognitive theory once occupied by the imagination. In
contem poraiy Cognitive Science, imageryis usuallytreated as merelya representationally
dependentauxiliaryto other, more fundamental and "abstract" forms ofmental representation,
whetherthese be the pseudo-languages of "classical" Artificial Intelligence theories
(philosophicallyrepresented by Jerry Fodor's "mentalese"), the weightspaces and activation
patterns of connectionism, attractors in chaotic neural dynamic systems, or whatever.
But ifsuch things do underlie ourthought processes, we are certainly not conscious of them
as such, and thus their relevance to explaining conscious thoughtwould seem to be, at best,
indirect. People are frequently conscious ofimagery, however, and it remains very arguable
(pace the Wtirfiaurg introspectors) that all conscious mental contents are imaginallperceptual
in character. The recently renewed interest in trying to develop a scientific account of
consciousness maythus be paving the way forthe imagination/sensus communis to be taken
seriouslyonce again.
Imagination and Possibility
One other issue desen/es mention. According to Hume "'Tis an established maxim in
metaphysics, That. . . nothing we imagine is absolutelyimpossible. We can form the idea ofa
golden mountain, and from thence conclude thatsuch a mountain may actually exist. We can
form no idea ofa mountain withouta valley, and therefore regard itas impossible." (Treatise, I,
ii, 2). (Note that, for Hume, "idea" explicitly meant mental image.) He seems to have meantthat
whatever is imaginable is possible, and, conversely, ifsomething is impossible it is also
unimaginable. Many philosophers have found this view significantand attractive. It would
certainly be very convenient for metaphysicians ifthere were a mental faculty capable of
providing a reliable testfor possibility!
Hume's maxim is very questionable, however. Although examples thatseem to favor it can be
multiplied, it is also not hard to come up with apparentcounter-examples. ltseems to me thatl
am incapable ofimagining curved space-time, but I am reliablyinformed that it is notonly
possible but actual. Conversely, countless science fiction buffs have imagined traveling faster
than light, which is supposedlyim possible. Perhaps some version ofthe maxim can be saved
bysufficiently ingenious maneuvers, probably including the restriction ofits scope to some or
other subspecies of possibility(perhaps itapplies to logical, conceptual, or metaphysical, but
not to physical possibility), butsuch issues lie well beyond the scope ofthis discussion. It is,
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however, worth mentioning that the maxim has verylittle purchase ifimagination is interpreted
after the fashion of those who would denyits essential connection with imagery. Clearlywe
can pretend or mistakenly believe that impossible things are possible, and we suppose an
impossibility everytime we set up a sound reductio ad absurdum proof. On the other hand, if
"imagination" is to be understood (as some recent philosophers claim) as something like "the
facultythatenvisages possibilities" (Rorty, 1988; c.f. White, 1990), then Hume's maxim would
seem to be true buttrivial. Who buta philosopher, however, would dream ofdenying that
imagination has to do with imagery?
Nigel J.T. Thomas
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